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Although Hilbert created no new set-theoretic theorems, he had a profound effect on the devel-
opment of set theory by his advocacy of its importance. This article explores Hilbert’s interac-
tions with set theory, as expressed in his published work and especially in his unpublished lecture
courses. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
Bien qu’il n’ait pas e´nonce´ de nouveaux the´ore`mes de la the´orie des ensembles, Hilbert a pro-
fonde´ment influen e´ le de´veloppement de cette dernie`re par ses plaidoyers visant a` en montrer l’impor-
tance en mathe´matiques. Le pre´sent article examine les interactions de Hilbert avec la the´orie des
ensembles telles qu’elles apparaissent dans ses oeuvres publie´es, mais surtout dans ses notes de cours
ine´dites. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
Obwohl Hilbert keine neuen mengentheoretischen Sa¨tze beigetragen hat, war sein Einflus auf die
Entwicklung dieses Gegenstandes a¨usserst bedeutsam, besonders wegen der Betonung derWichtigkeit.
Wir untersuchungen dieses Einfluss in seinen Vero¨ffentlichungen, und daru¨ber hinaus und besonders
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1. INTRODUCTION
“No one shall expel us from the paradise which Cantor has created for us.” In this famous
sentence of 1926, Hilbert echoes (and negates) the expulsion of Adam from the Garden of
Eden [1926, 170]. It reflect Hilbert’s vigorous advocacy of set theory, an advocacy which
he pursued for more than three decades. That advocacy is familiar to both set theorists [Jech
1978, vii] and historians [Mehrtens 1990, 164].
Yet no one has studied in its entirety the role that set theory played for Hilbert—in
his personal interactions (with Bernstein, Cantor, Hausdorff, Minkowski, and Zermelo,
among others), in his published work, and in his unpublished lectures. The present article
attempts to do so, placing particular emphasis on unpublished materials. The emphasis
here is on Hilbert’s influenc in making set-theoretic ideas respectable and widespread—
thereby shedding light both on set theory itself, as a mathematical discipline, and on the
social interactions that led to its increasing influenc in the early 20th century.
To understand the role that set theory played in Hilbert’s work, it is vital to conceive
of set theory in a broad sense. Set theory, in this context, is the mathematical study of
infinit classes. With this definition the importance of set theory in the emergence of mod-
ern mathematics becomes clear. Set theory is not just Cantor’s infinit cardinal and ordinal
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numbers, but also includes the set-theoretic techniques, coming largely from Dedekind,
that revolutionized algebra. Dedekind’s use of inf nite classes (as opposed to merely work-
ing, as Gauss had done, with representatives of equivalence classes) deepened algebraic
number theory, culminating in Hilbert’s justly famous Zahlbericht, and, in time, led to the
creation of modern algebra through techniques which simultaneously relied on Cantor’s
ordinals and Dedekind’s set-theoretic constructions (e.g. Steinitz’s work on f elds). It
is to be regretted that so little is known about the interactions between Dedekind and
Hilbert.1
Hilbert’s f rst systematic use of inf nite sets occurred in 1894 when he gave a new proof
of Dedekind’s fundamental theorem that, in an algebraic number f eld, every ideal can be
decomposed uniquely into a product of prime ideals [Hilbert 1894]. But it is likely that
Hilbert had been introduced to Dedekind’s approach to number theory in his student days,
when he took a course in number theory from Dedekind’s friend and algebraic collaborator,
HeinrichWeber [Blumenthal 1935, 389]. (Indeed,Weber was the f rst to use set theory in an
algebra textbook.) When he turned from the invariant theory of his Doktorvater Lindemann
to algebraic number theory, Hilbert was greatly inf uenced by Dedekind’s formulation of
ideal theory, which depended in an essential way on the use of inf nite sets. (Hilbert, like
Dedekind before him, was not using inf nite sets in general but just those inf nite sets that
are finitely generated.) In his 1897 Zahlbericht on algebraic number theory, Hilbert wrote
that “in general the modern development of pure mathematics takes place under the sign of
number: Dedekind’s andWeierstrass’s def nitions of the fundamental arithmetic notions and
Cantor’s formation of [real] numbers lead to an arithmetization of function theory” [1897,
66]. Here Hilbert saw real analysis as reducible to the rational numbers; the essential role
which set theory played in that reduction was not yet altogether clear. In fact, the question
of the precise relationship between arithmetic and set theory would be an major theme of
Hilbert’s later work.
Hilbert’s favorable attitude toward Cantor and Dedekind must be contrasted with that
of his eminent colleague at Go¨ttingen, Felix Klein. In his lengthy 1928 book on the de-
velopment of mathematics in the 19th century, Klein did not mention Cantor’s work even
once—despite having edited several of Cantor’s articles for Mathematische Annalen. By
contrast, Klein brief y mentioned Dedekind’s work on algebraic number theory, but re-
marked that Dedekind’s terminology was “unpleasant” and “altogether unintuitive” [1928,
304]. Dedekind, Klein added, had taken an “abstract turn,” i.e., had worked with inf nite
sets of numbers rather than with individual numbers. He regarded Hilbert as too “attached
to Dedekind’s way of thinking” [1928, 310].
2. HILBERT, MINKOWSKI, AND CANTOR: 1895
It is uncertain when Hilbert f rst learned of Cantor’s set theory. Perhaps he did so from
Hurwitz, who, coming to Ko¨nigsberg in 1884, was soon in intimate scientif c contact with
Hilbert and had just made one of the earliest uses, in complex analysis, of Cantor’s results
on inf nite cardinals [1883, 204]—a usewhichHilbert himself remarked in his later obituary
for Hurwitz. Certainly Cantor was already mentioned in a letter that Hilbert’s close friend
Minkowski sent to him, in June 1889, about meeting Cantor while at Kronecker’s home
1 The author is far from unique in arguing for this broader understanding of set theory. A similar view was taken
in 1965 by Medvedev [1965], and more recently by Ferreiros [1993] and [1999].
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[Minkowski 1973, 35]. When Minkowski wrote to Hilbert in 1895, he referred to Cantor in
the course of discussing a lecture that he had recently given on the inf nite:
The “actual inf nite” is an expression that I took from a paper by Cantor, and for the most part I included
in my lecture theorems of Cantor which have a general interest. Only a few did not want to believe in
them. The actual inf nite in nature, about which I mainly spoke... was the position of points in space....
On this occasion I perceived anew that Cantor is one of the most ingenious living mathematicians. His
purely abstract def nition of the power [cardinal number] of points on a line segment with the help of
the so-called transf nite numbers is really wonderful. [1973, 68]
Hilbert returned to this theme in his 1910 obituary for Minkowski, showing his strong
support for set theory, which he called “that mathematical discipline which today plays a
prominent role and exercises a powerful inf uence on all f elds of mathematics” [1910b,
466]. Hilbert contrasted that inf uence in 1910 with the position of set theory some decades
earlier, when Kronecker had attacked it: “Minkowski was the f rst mathematician of our
generation—and I supported him vigorously in this—who recognized the great signif cance
of Cantor’s theory and sought to see it respected” [1910b, 466]. In his unpublished 1920
lectures on logic, Hilbert again aff rmed his and Minkowski’s role in support of set theory:
For a time the inf uence of Kronecker’s direction was very strong, and in my student years it was
clearly disreputable to concern oneself with set theory. Through the mystical embellishment, which in
the beginning Cantor gave to his theory, the antipathy to it was intensif ed. The f rst in the younger
generation who seriously espoused Cantor’s cause were Minkowski and myself.... [1920, 21]
Blumenthal, in his authorized biography of Hilbert, pointed out that the only publication
from Hilbert’s f rst period on a topic other than invariant theory was on “a set-theoretic
theme” [1935, 389]. What Blumenthal had in mind was Hilbert’s brief article on a Peano
curve [1891]. Although Hilbert did not cite Cantor directly in that paper, he did cite Peano
[1890], who in turn had referred explicitly to Cantor’s work.
3. HILBERT ENCOUNTERS CANTOR: 1897–1900
The earliest known encounter between Cantor and Hilbert took place on 25 September
1897. For the next day, Cantor wrote to Hilbert:
Unfortunately, because of an early lunch yesterday at the Braunschweig Polytechnic, I had to break
off our conversation about set theory at the point where you had just raised the question whether all
transf nite cardinal numbers... are included in the alephs, in other words whether each def nite a or b is
also a def nite aleph. [1991, 388]
The question which Hilbert raised, i.e., whether every def nite well-def ned completed
[fertige] set can be well-ordered, was to be the subject of quite a few letters between them.2
And in 1900 Hilbert made it part of the f rst of his famous problems for the 20th century. It
would lead to Zermelo’s 1904 letter to Hilbert, proving by means of his Axiom of Choice
that the answer to the question is yes (See [Moore 1982].)
But in the letter of September 1897 Cantor’s concern was twofold. First, he was in
the process of preparing a third installment to his article “Beitra¨ge zur Begru¨ndung der
2 Only Cantor’s side of the correspondence survives, within Hilbert’s Nachlass. Some of these letters are
discussed by Purkert [1986], who rightly recognizes that Cantor was not bothered by the paradoxes because he
had already made the relevant distinction in 1883 between those collections small enough to be sets and those that
were too big to be sets (e.g., the collection of all sets).
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transf niten Mengenlehre,” which had appeared in Mathematische Annalen in 1895 and
1897. Klein had seen those two installments through press, but for some reason Can-
tor now preferred to discuss the third installment (which, in fact, would never be f n-
ished and is not extant) with another, and newer, member of the Annalen editorial board:
Hilbert. Second, Cantor was concerned to prove that the answer to Hilbert’s question was
yes, in the sense that every “def nite well-def ned completed [fertige] set” can be well-
ordered. Cantor did so by pointing out that the collection of all alephs is not such a set
M , since if it were, then M would have an aleph as its cardinal number, and hence this
aleph would have another aleph following it but also belonging to M—a contradiction
[1991, 388]. (In effect, this was a form of what was later called Burali–Forti’s para-
dox; on the tangled history of this paradox, see [Moore and Garciadiego 1981] in this
journal.)
Hilbert, however, was not convinced of the correctness of Cantor’s proof and replied the
very next day: “The collection of alephs can be conceived as a def nite well-def ned set,
since, after all, if any object is given, it must always be determinate whether this object is an
aleph or not; more than this is not required of a well-def ned set.”3 Here Hilbert was merely
following the criterion for being a set that Cantor himself had introduced some years earlier
[1882, 114].
A few days later, on 2 October 1897, Cantor tried to meet Hilbert’s objection. Cantor
emphasized that in his September letter he had required not just a def nite well-def ned set
but a completed set, and stated explicitly as a theorem that “the totality of all alephs cannot
be conceived as a def nite, well-def ned and at the same time completed set” [1991, 390].
He attempted to make his views precise:
I venture to designate this theorem, which is completely secure and is proved from the definition of the
“totality of all alephs,” as the most important and noble theorem of set theory. But one must understand
the expression “completed” correctly. I say of a set that it can be thought of as completed, and I name
such a set “transfinite” ... when it is inf nite, if it is possible without contradiction (as is the case for
f nite sets) to think of all its elements as existing together and hence the set itself as joined together as a
thing by itself; or also, in other words, if it is possible to think of the set with the totality of its elements
as presently existing. [1991, 390]
But even after this explanation, Hilbert was not completely satisf ed with Cantor’s concep-
tion of “completed” set and regarded it, quite correctly, as lacking in precision. (Cantor
was mistaken in thinking that the class of all alephs was self-contradictory, but not until
von Neumann’s work in the 1920s [1925] was it clear that the problem was in allowing
such a proper class to be a member of a set; allowing this was what led to a contra-
diction, not the mere existence of such large classes, which are today used routinely in
set theory.) Meanwhile, on 11 October 1897, Cantor wrote again, pointing out that the
set of all continuous real functions has the same cardinal as the set of all real numbers
[1991, 391].
Despite his reservations about “completed” sets, Hilbert was already impressed with
Cantorian set theory. In Hilbert’s Nachlass is a bound notebook with notes from two of
his short courses for school teachers. The second of them reads: “Feriencursus: u¨ber den
3 This is one of the few passages that survive from Hilbert’s side of the correspondence, in this case because
Cantor quoted it in his letter of 2 October.
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Begriff des Unendlichen. Ostern 1898.” This was a short course which he gave, at Easter
1898, on the inf nite in geometry and in arithmetic.4 It is the earliest known reference in his
writings to Cantor’s work (e.g., [1895, 1897]).
In the course, Hilbert wished to show the connection between school mathematics and
the “most modern” research in mathematics by describing this connection in regard to “one
of the most important concepts in mathematics: the concept of the inf nite” [1898, 1]. He
pointed out the errors in earlier treatments of the inf nite, where “one tended to transfer
to inf nite systems [i.e., sets] properties which were obvious for f nite systems” [1898, 3].
He contrasted this with the “modern treatment of the concept of the inf nite,” namely
Cantor’s transf nite cardinals [1898, 7]. In particular, he gave Cantor’s proof that the
set of rational numbers is countable and showed, as Cantor had done in his October
letter, that the set of all continuous functions has no greater power than the set of real
numbers.
Hilbert’s 1898 course at Go¨ttingen was one of the f rst in Germany to speak in detail
about set theory. (A year earlier, in France, Borel had given a course on function theory that
included a good deal of set theory [1898, vii].) The f rst lecture courses devoted entirely to
set theory were given soon afterward: by Zermelo at Go¨ttingen (1900), then Hausdorff at
Leipzig (1901), and Landau at Berlin (1902).5
On 16 September 1898, Hilbert wrote again to Cantor, proposing that they should meet
in Dusseldorf. Cantor replied on 6 October, explaining that he had been on vacation with his
family in Oberhof and that Hilbert’s letter had not been forwarded to him. After expressing
regret that he had been unable to meet Hilbert in Dusseldorf, Cantor was “happy for the
interest that you show in set theory. How often during the past year my thoughts have
involuntarily turned to you with the question whether your participation opposite me in
researchwould really begranted” [1991, 393].The rest of the letterwasdevoted to explaining
what he meant by “completed set.”
Cantor wrote again four days later, and on that occasion came close to formulating an
axiomatization for set theory. It was not an axiomatization because, in trying to answer
Hilbert’s critique, Cantor proposed to def ne the notion of set rather than to axiomatize it.
Cantor’s def nitionwas the following: “By a completed set is to be understood any collection
all of whose elements exist together without a contradiction and hence can be conceived
as a thing by itself ” [1991, 396]. He then argued that many theorems followed from this
def nition, and the following four in particular:
I. If M is a completed set, then every subset of M is also a completed set.
II. If completed sets are substituted for the elements of a completed set M , then the
resulting collection is a completed set.
4 This course, particularly as it concerns geometry, is discussed in [Toepell 1986, 115–142]. There Toepell
points out that, surprisingly and mistakenly, Hilbert believed in 1898 that the Archimedean Axiom is equivalent
to continuity in the usual sense [1986, 127].
5 Hausdorff gave his course to three students. See the report on his call to Leipzig in 1901 by H. Bruns in
[Beckert and Purkert 1987, 234]. Shields [1989, 8] thought that Hausdorff’s course, delivered in the summer
semester of 1901, was “the f rst lecture course on set theory anywhere in Germany.” The previous winter semester
of 1900–1901, however, Zermelo had also given such a course. Landau’s course of one hour per week was given in
the winter semester of 1902–1903 to 84 students, and he offered it again two years later to 119 students [Biermann
1973, 138].
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III. If two collections are equivalent [equipotent] and one of them is a completed set,
then so is the other.
IV. The collection of all subsets of a completed set M is a completed set. [1991, 396]
Cantor added that it seemed to him an “axiomatically certain” proposition that denumer-
able collections are completed sets, whereas it could then be proved, from III and IV, that
the linear continuum is a completed set. Finally, he believed that it could be proved that the
alephs ℵ1, ℵ2, ... are completed sets.
These four “theorems” bear a strong resemblance to the later axioms of set theory put
forward by Zermelo and others. In particular, Theorems I and IV are close to Zermelo’s
Axiom of Separation and his Axiom of Power Set (1908), while II and III are forms of
the Axiom of Replacement due to Fraenkel (1921) and Mirimanoff (1917) respectively.
Two years later, Cantor presented essentially the same def nition of completed set, and its
consequences, to Dedekind [1991, 407].
On 9 May 1899, Cantor wrote again to Hilbert, in reply to the latter’s postcard, noting
that he now used the term “consistent” where he had formerly used “completed” and had
changed his usage so that what he previously called “completed sets” were now called
“sets” or “consistent collections [consistente Vielheiten]”. He then remarked that
it is our common conviction that the “arithmetic continuum” is a “set” in this sense; the question is
whether this truth is provable or whether it is an axiom. I now incline more to the latter alternative,
although I would gladly be convinced by you of the former. [1991, 399]
A few letters later, Cantor thanked Hilbert on 20 June for his kindness when Cantor, who
had come to Go¨ttingen for the unveiling of the Gauss–Weber monument, was a guest in his
home. Cantor added, in regard to his third article continuing in the Annalen those of 1895
and 1897, that it “has been for years, as you know, completed in regard to its content; I hope
soon to come to putting it down on paper.”6 On 28 June, Cantor sent some notes on the
four possible relations of cardinality between two sets, with the intention that these notes
would be passed on to Arthur Schoenf ies [1991, 401–403]. In the letter accompanying
those notes, Cantor commented on Hilbert’s axioms for geometry, and then pointed out a
set-theoretic error in Weber’s algebra textbook. Weber had claimed [Vol. 2, 2nd ed., 823]
that the order-typeω could be characterized by the condition that it have a f rst element, that
every element have an immediate successor, and that every element except the f rst have an
immediate predecessor. Cantor observed that, on the contrary, the order-types ω + ∗ω + ω
andω + ∗ω + ω + ∗ω + ω also satisfy that condition. He ended the letter with a conjecture:
All denumerable order-types can be generated from the f nite and denumerable ordinals,
the inverse operation ∗α, and the order-type η of the rationals.
InAugust 1899, Cantor correspondedwithDedekind about the collection of all alephs and
about the distinction between consistent and inconsistent collections (a distinction that had
already been the subject of many letters between Cantor and Hilbert). Writing to Hilbert
on 15 November, Cantor mentioned that he would already have sent Hilbert that third
installment for the Annalen if he had received a reply from Dedekind to his letters on the
correct foundation for set theory. Cantor saw Dedekind’s set-theoretic work, particularly
6 This letter, like that of 28 June below, is previously unpublished and is found in Hilbert’s Nachlass, Cod.
Ms. D. Hilbert 54.
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Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?, as threatened—in contrast to Cantor’s own work
which, since 1883, had distinguished between consistent and inconsistent collections: “My
foundation stands diametrically opposed to the core of his investigations, which consist in
the naive assumption that every well-defined collection or system is always also a ‘consistent
system”’ [1991, 414]. He added that he had noticed Dedekind’s error a decade before, but
had only had the occasion this year to bring it to Dedekind’s attention. Continuing on this
theme in his letter of 27 January 1900, Cantor explained that his third installment was
delayed by the need to answer the conf icting claims of “two great authorities, Gauss and
Dedekind,” i.e., Gauss’s view that all inf nite sets are inconsistent and Dedekind’s view that
inconsistent sets are consistent [1991, 427].7
Beginning inMay1899,Hilbert also received letters fromSchoenf ies about theBerichton
set theory which he was then preparing. (Their extant correspondence began with this letter,
presumably since Schoenf ies left Go¨ttingen in 1899 to take up a position as Ordinarius
in Ko¨nigsberg.) On 28 June, Cantor sent Hilbert various remarks on cardinality which
were intended for Schoenf ies [1991, 403]. Hilbert apparently informed Schoenf ies about
Zermelo’s discovery of Russell’s paradox, since Schoenf ies wrote to Hilbert on 17 October
1899: “May I ask you once more to communicate how you have constructed the set such
that every set is contained in it as a subset?”8 And on 28 December 1900, Schoenf ies asked
Hilbert if he would have Zermelo send any gaps or errors that Zermelo found in the Bericht
on set theory: “He is perhaps the only person who will really read the Bericht.” 9
During 1899–1900 Felix Bernstein, who had previously studied with Cantor at Halle,
took courses from Hilbert, Klein, and Zermelo at Go¨ttingen. Bernstein chose Hilbert as the
supervisor of his dissertation, which contained a variety of topics in set theory, especially
the Cantor–Bernstein Theorem. In its “Lebenslauf” he thanked “Professor Cantor, who
introduced me to the f eld of set theory, for the scientif c stimulation received from him and
above all for the steady interest and benevolence that he has always shown toward me, as
well as Professor Hilbert for the assistance that was my share of him” [1901, 55]. Bernstein
was the f rst student to write a dissertation under Hilbert on set theory, and was the last to
do so until Kurt Grelling in 1910.
4. HILBERT’S PARIS LECTURE: 1900
In his paper “U¨ber den Zahlbegriff,” dated October 1899 but published in 1900, Hilbert
discussed Cantor’s work in print for the f rst time. There Hilbert gave his axioms for the real
numbers and suggested (wrongly, as it turned out) that their consistency could be shown
by “appropriate modif cations of known methods of proof” [1900a, 184]. At the end of the
paper he turned to Cantor’s work: “If we wished to prove the existence of the collection of
all powers (or of all Cantor’s alephs), the attempt would fail. In fact, the collection of all
powers does not exist, or—in Cantor’s manner of expression—the system of all powers is an
7 Waterhouse [1979] has noted in this journal, correctly, that Gauss’s remarks were not directed against set
theory, which in any case did not exist at that time. But Cantor saw Gauss’s remarks as aimed against the actual
inf nite, and therefore against set theory. Cantor did so in 1883, when he learned of Gauss’s remarks, and continued
to do so in his 1900 letter [Cantor 1991, 148].
8 Cod. Ms. D. Hilbert 355, Letter 5.
9 Cod. Ms. D. Hilbert 355, Letter 9. By October 1899, Schoenf ies knew Hilbert well enough to address him in
the letter as “Dear friend.”
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inconsistent (incomplete) set” [1900a, 184]. Here Hilbert was referring to matters from his
unpublished correspondence with Cantor; in January 1900, Cantor had written to Hilbert
with what he called the “Axiom of Transf nite Number Theory,” which asserted that every
collection whose power is an aleph is consistent [1991, 427].
Within that same letter Cantor analyzed what he saw as three different kinds of axioms.
First, there were the “logical axioms,” which all sciences had in common and which “have
been recently treated systematically in the logical calculus” [1991, 426]. Second, there
were the “physical axioms of mathematics,” i.e., the axioms of geometry and of mechanics.
Third, there were the “metaphysical axioms of mathematics,” which included above all the
axioms of f nite and transf nite arithmetic. Cantor’s concept of axiom is clearly distinct from
Hilbert’s, but it is nevertheless signif cant that they exchanged letters concerning axioms.
In his earlierworkon algebraic number theory [1897, 69, 73] and in that on the foundations
of geometry (1899), Hilbert had used Dedekind’s term “systems” (“Systeme”) for “sets”
rather than Cantor’s term “Mengen.” Beginning with the paper “U¨ber den Zahlbegriff,”
Hilbert began to speak occasionally of “Mengen,” although even in his Paris lecture he
referred more frequently to “Systeme.”
In his Paris lecture of 1900 on his 23 problems, Hilbert praised Cantor. Hilbert argued that
in the foundations of analysis and geometry the most important results obtained during the
19th century were “the arithmetic conception of the notion of the continuum in the works of
Cauchy, Bolzano, and Cantor” and the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry [1900b, 298].
Hilbert’s problems referred explicitly to set theory. The f rst asked for a proof of Cantor’s
Continuum Hypothesis that every uncountable set of real numbers has the same cardinal
number as the set of all real numbers, as well as for a proof that the real numbers can be
well-ordered.
Hilbert’s second problem sought a direct consistency proof for the axioms of the real
number system (as opposed to a relative consistency proof such as the one that he had given
in 1899 for geometry). He was convinced that there was such a direct proof for the real
numbers, and equally convinced that this was so in the case of Cantor’s inf nite ordinals
and alephs. By contrast, Hilbert believed that the collection of all of Cantor’s alephs was
inconsistent [1900b, 301]. Although in 1900 Hilbert was aware of various paradoxes of set
theory, he did not show any concern that set theory, or logic, was threatened. The matter
would look very different to him in 1904 when he returned to the subject.
5. HILBERT AT HEIDELBERG AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS: 1904–1905
When Hilbert spoke on the foundations of arithmetic to the International Congress of
Mathematicians at Heidelberg in August 1904, he criticized earlier researchers in the area,
such as Dedekind, Frege, and Kronecker. In discussing Frege, Hilbert mentioned for the
f rst time in his writings the set-theoretic paradoxes (especially Russell’s paradox which
had just appeared in Frege’sGrundgesetze (1903)) and the importance of overcoming them.
The last to be criticized was Cantor, whose earlier letters Hilbert had in mind:
Cantor was aware of the contradiction just mentioned [of the set of all sets] and gave substance to this
awareness by distinguishing between “consistent” and “inconsistent” sets. Since in my view, however,
he provides no precise criterion for this distinction, I must describe his conception of this matter as one
that still leaves room for subjective opinion and hence furnishes no objective certainty. [1905a, 176]
Hilbert then presented his axiomatic method as an objective way out of the paradoxes.
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During the summer semester of 1905, while giving a course called “Logical Principles
of Mathematical Thought,” Hilbert touched on these matters at greater length.10 “It is the
merit of set theory,” he argued, “to have brought these contradictions [of both set theory
and logic] to light” [1905b, 5].
Hilbert compared the development of set theory to that of the inf nitesimal calculus
and of geometry. Both geometry and the calculus were built, he observed, in a way just
opposite to that of a house. The living room was built f rst, and only later when the security
of the structure was in danger were the foundations built. Such was the proper order in
mathematics, with a naive period followed by a critical period, in which the foundations
must be investigated and strengthened [1905b, 191–194].
Here it concerns set theory, which about 30 years ago began to f nd its way through hard struggle. It is
now in a state very similar to that of the inf nitesimal calculus before the critical period got underway;
only here it is a matter of questions which tend to be essentially deeper as regards theoretical philosophy
than those which arose earlier. [1905b, 194–195]
He compared the use of Aristotelian logic in set theory to the unrestrained use, in inf nite
series, of the commutative law, which then led to contradictions. “Exactly in this way, by
using purely logical operations that elsewhere in mathematics and logic are used without
scruple (here it is particularly a matter of collecting many concepts into a general concept),
one arrives in set theory at unsolvable contradictions, which may not be clarif ed with the
tools available up to now” [1905b, 195].
By way of example, Hilbert discussed countability, and described as “one of the most
beautiful proofs in set theory” Cantor’s demonstration that the set of real numbers is un-
countable, whereas the rationals are countable [1905b, 196]. But Hilbert’s perplexity with
the fundamental issues was clear from his handwritten comment in the margin: “Why is
the totality of all sets not permissible? Why is the set of all real numbers a permissible
collection?” [1905b, 215].
After mentioning Richard’s paradox and the liar paradox, Hilbert turned to Russell’s
paradox (which he credited to Zermelo) and to his own paradox. Hilbert described the
Zermelo–Russell paradox as “purely logical,” whereas he himself had found a paradox
(or contradiction) that he described as “purely mathematical” [1905b, 204, 210]. Regard-
ing his own paradox, Hilbert said: “At f rst, when I discovered it, I believed that insur-
mountable diff culties lay in the way of set theory and that on those diff culties it must
founder” [1905b, 204]. But now he was sure that, “as always up to now in science,” a
revision in the foundations would suff ce to preserve what was essential. Although he had
not published his paradox, it was, he insisted, known to set theorists and to Cantor in
particular.
Hilbert’s paradox began with the set of natural numbers, and closed it under two opera-
tions. The f rst of these was the operation of taking the union of a family of sets; the second
was the “covering” operation on a set M that gives the set of all functions from M to M .
This closure was a totality T of sets, and the union of T was called U . He then def ned
the set F of all functions from U to U . The contradiction resulted from asserting that F is
a member of U , by using Cantor’s diagonalization process to f nd a member of F that is
10 For more details on this course, see [Peckhaus 1990, 58–72; 1994; 1994a].
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not in U [1905b, 207].11 Why Hilbert regarded this as a contradiction is not clear, since he
could equally well have regarded it as showing that U is not a member of itself. But it was
certainly constructed by using Cantorian tools.
The cause of these various contradictions, in Hilbert’s eyes, was taking the “totality of
all things” as a consistent set. He added that Dedekind himself no longer regarded this
totality as a satisfactory foundation for number, and, as a result, did not permit his Was sind
und was sollen die Zahlen? to be reprinted. Thus Hilbert seems to have adopted Cantor’s
view that Dedekind’s work was particularly threatened by the paradoxes. Nevertheless,
Hilbert credited Dedekind with being the f rst to recognize, in contrast to Weierstrass and
Kronecker, that the natural numbers needed to be “reduced to logic” [1905b, 212].
Hilbert concluded those lectures by describing them as “only a f rst preliminary attempt”
to solve the foundational questions:
Finally I want to point out once again the great merit that G. Cantor and Dedekind have earned in regard
to all of these questions. One could candidly say that in this context both men are what Newton and
Leibniz were for the inf nitesimal calculus. Just as Newton and Leibniz began a great development,
which f rst took a decisive step forward with Cauchy and f nally arrived at a complete resolution of all
diff culties with modern “Weierstrassian” rigor, so also, in set theory and the questions now surrounding
it, a new and primarily clarifying development appears to be beginning. [1905b, 272]
Although Hilbert saw the axiomatic method as the heart of this new development, he did
not propose an axiomatization of set theory. But such an axiomatization was the fruit of a
mathematician heavily inf uenced by Hilbert: Ernst Zermelo.
In a reportwritten sometimebetween1930and1933 to theNotgemeinschaft derDeutschen
Wissenschaften, Zermelo observed: “Already 30 years ago, when I was a Privatdozent at
Go¨ttingen, I began under the inf uence of D. Hilbert, whom I have the most to thank
for my scientif c development, to concern myself with the foundations of mathematics,
and particularly with the fundamental problems of Cantorian set theory, of which I f rst
became fully aware through the mutual cooperation, at that time so fruitful, of the Go¨ttingen
mathematicians” [Zermelo in [Moore 1980, 130]].
The earliest fruit of Zermelo’s efforts was twofold. First, as mentioned above, during
1900–1901 he gave a course on set theory. Unfortunately, his notes for that course which
survive in his Nachlass are written in an obscure shorthand, and so it is unlikely that we
shall ever know what they say.12 Second, in 1901 he published his f rst paper on set theory,
giving a new proof of the Cantor–Bernstein Theorem by using inf nite series of inf nite
cardinals [1901].
Zermelo’s f rstmajor contribution to set theorywas his proof of September 1904 that every
set can be well-ordered. This proof, based on his Axiom of Choice, was written as a letter
to Hilbert for publication in Mathematische Annalen [1904]. Zermelo’s proof evoked an
extremely vigorous reaction on the part of mathematicians from England, France, Germany,
Hungary, and Italy (see [Moore 1982, 85–150]).
The role of Hilbert in this set-theoretic controversy is clear from his undated letter of late
1904 to his friend Adolf Hurwitz:
11 Hilbert’s paradox was f rst discussed in print in [Peckhaus 1990, 52–54].
12 According to Hans Gebhardt, an expert on German shorthand, Zermelo used the system of shorthand invented
by Leopold Arends, a system that is quite diff cult and has many exception rules (personal communication from
Volker Peckhaus).
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I have spokenmymind to Schoenf ies about Zermelo’s proof, which recently appeared in the Annalen, of
the possibility of well-ordering all sets. Schoenf ies raised objections against Zermelo which, however, I
do not f nd any more correct than those that Bernstein (Halle) maintains. The whole polemic will appear
in one of the next issues of the Annalen. The foundations of arithmetic will be considered from the most
different perspectives. [Hilbert in [Dugac 1976, 271]]
Thus Hilbert helped stimulate the controversy surrounding Zermelo’s proof and the Axiom
of Choice by making the Annalen available as a sounding board. In particular, Emile Borel
wrote to Hilbert on 30 October 1904, expressing reservations about that proof.13 Borel’s
reservations were then published in the Annalen [1905], as were those of Bernstein [1905],
Jourdain [1905], and Schoenf ies [1905]. In the 1920s, as we shall see below, Zermelo’s
Axiom of Choice proved to be very important in Hilbert’s Beweistheorie.
The next sentence inHilbert’s letter toHurwitz shows that this controversy over Zermelo’s
proof was connected in his mind to larger questions about the foundations of set theory and
mathematics: “I have long held the view that it is precisely themost important and interesting
questions of Dedekind and Cantor which have not yet been settled (and especially not by
Weierstrass and Kronecker)” [Hilbert in [Dugac 1976, 271]]. In order, as Hilbert put it, “to
have the necessity of ref ecting on them coherently,” he had announced the course for the
summer of 1905 that was discussed above.
During 1905, Zermelo was away from Go¨ttingen for reasons of health, and carried on a
correspondence with Hilbert that was concerned, in good part, with set theory. On 7 May,
Zermelo wrote that he was resuming his research on set theory, and on 27 June, that he
had found that the axiom of choice was needed to prove the equivalence of Dedekind’s
def nition of f niteness with the usual def nition using natural numbers. The following day,
Zermelo wrote again, giving a new proof of the Equivalence Theorem that used Dedekind’s
theory of chains. (Three decades later, Emmy Noether would publish the fragment from
Dedekind’s Nachlass that showed he had found it himself in 1887, but, though he had sent
it to Cantor in 1897, had never published it.)
6. INTERLUDE: 1906–1916
Hilbert’s 1905 attempt in his lecture course to solve the set-theoretic paradoxes and to
deal with the foundations of mathematics was not successful, as he realized himself at
the time. Nevertheless, he came back to the subject in a lecture course, “Prinzipien der
Mathematik,” which he gave during the summer semester of 1908, and a second course,
“Elemente und Prinzipienfragen der Mathematik” [1910a]. In his 1905 course geometry
had played a subsidiary role, serving as an example of an important axiom system. But in
the 1908 course, geometry predominated entirely. Despite its title, the course was devoted
to the theory of ruler and compass constructions, culminating in Lindemann’s proof of the
transcendence of π . Only the introduction was devoted to larger questions of foundations,
mentioning brief y the work of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass on the foundations of
the real numbers [1908, 3]. Logical and set-theoretic questions were more or less absent,
although the axiomatic method was emphasized.
The 1910 course was very similar to the 1908 course, sharing about half the material.
Only in the last seven pages of the 1910 course did Hilbert discuss logic and the set-theoretic
paradoxes [1910a, 157–163]. The material he gave there was merely a more elementary
13 Borel’s letter is found in Hilbert’s Nachlass, Cod. Ms. D. Hilbert 39.
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version of material from his 1905 course. In 1910 he used the same version of the logical
calculus that he had in the 1905 course, viz. Schro¨der’s version of Boolean algebra.14
One of the striking features of Hilbert’s lectures of 1908 and 1910 was that they did not
mention Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory at all. Zermelo had given a lecture on those
axioms to the Go¨ttingen Mathematical Society in June 1906 [Zermelo 1906], and in 1907
he submitted an article on them toMathematische Annalen,where it appeared the following
year [1908]. ThusHilbertwaswell aware ofZermelo’s axiomatization.Nevertheless,Hilbert
did not mention it in his letter of January 1910 evaluating Zermelo for a professorship at
Zurich, although he emphasized the importance of Zermelo’s Well-Ordering Theorem, as
he had done in 1907 when recommending Zermelo for an extraordinary professorship at
Go¨ttingen.15 It is surprising that Hilbert’s earliest reference to Zermelo’s axiomatization
appears in his Zurich lecture of September 1917, “Axiomatisches Denkern.”
7. HILBERT IN 1917: SET THEORY
During the summer semester of 1917 Hilbert gave his f rst course devoted entirely to set
theory.16 The basic view of set theory that he espoused there seems all but a truism now:
“Today set theory is that mathematical discipline upon which all others are built” [1917,
124]. Yet at the time it was not a truism but a distinctly controversial statement. Very few
mathematicians had made such a statement by 1917, and only a few more had accepted it.
No doubt the earliest to do so was Cantor, who wrote on the subject in his article of 1885,
submitted for publication in Acta Mathematica but then withdrawn, on the theory of order
types:
By all indications the general theory of [order] types seems to me to promise great usefulness.
It forms a large and important part of pure set theory, therefore also of pure mathematics, the latter being
in my conception nothing other than pure set theory.
Then it stands in a close relation to the remaining parts of pure, but also to applied, set theory, as for
example the theory of point sets, the theory of functions, and mathematical physics. [1885/1970, 84]
When Cantor rewrote that article for publication in a philosophical journal [1887; 1888], he
omitted the passage quoted. Cantor never stated in print that all of mathematics can be built
up from set theory. Nor did Cantor give a clear statement of this claim in what survives of
his extensive correspondence, perhaps the closest being in his letter of 20 September 1912
to Hilbert [Cantor 1991, 459].
Among thosewho saw eye to eyewithHilbert on the role of set theorywasHausdorff, who
hadwritten in his 1914 book: “Set theory is the foundation of all ofmathematics; differential
and integral calculus, analysis and geometry continually work in reality, if also perhaps in a
veiled manner, with inf nite sets” [1914, 1]. Hausdorff shared with Hilbert the view that set
theorywas the foundation for all of mathematics, both analysis and geometry.17 Zermelo, on
the other hand, appeared in 1908 to view set theory in a somewhat more restricted fashion:
14 On Hilbert’s logical calculus of 1905, see [Peckhaus 1990, 61–67].
15 See Hilbert’s Nachlass, Cod. Ms. D. Hilbert 492, items 3 and 4.
16 The only other course that Hilbert gave on set theory was one from 1929 called “Mengenlehre,” according
to the list of his lecture courses in his Nachlass (Cod. Ms. D. Hilbert 520). But no version of the 1929 course is
known to be extant.
17 It will come as no surprise that Hausdorff’s book was one of only three sources which Hilbert cited in the
bibliography for his course.
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“Set theory is that branch of mathematics whose task it is to investigate mathematically the
fundamental notions of number, order, and function in their original simplicity and thereby
to develop the logical foundations of all of arithmetic and analysis” [1908, 261]. Zermelo,
unlike Hausdorff, made no mention that set theory was the foundation of geometry. If one
accepted that geometry was founded on analysis, then Zermelo’s perspective would agree
with those of Hausdorff and Hilbert. But it is not certain that Zermelo did so.
Around 1917 thereweremanymathematicianswho did not regard set theory as the proper
foundation for all ofmathematics. Some of themwere suspicious of set theory, such asmany
Frenchmathematicians, including somewho had used parts of it in their research (e.g., Rene´
Baire and Henri Lebesgue). Some rejected set theory as a foundation and rejected mathe-
matical logic at the same time, as did L. E. J. Brouwer and Henri Poincare´. Some rejected
set theory as a foundation because the proper foundation of mathematics was mathematical
logic; here the most striking representative was Bertrand Russell. And many, perhaps most,
mathematicians at the time showed no concern with foundational questions at all.
In his lecture courseHilbert regarded set theory as “the creation of a singlemathematician,
George Cantor” [1917, 1], not mentioning Dedekind’s contributions. He spoke of set theory
in mythological fashion, echoing Ariadne’s help for Theseus against the minotaur, as “the
red thread for orientation in the mathematical labyrinth, whose pursuit leads to the source
of mathematical, and even general philosophical, knowledge” [1917, 1].
Holding such a high opinion of set theory, Hilbert does surprisingly little with it in his
course. It would seem natural, for example, that he would show how within set theory the
natural numbers can be built up as sets, then the rational numbers and even the real numbers.
But he did not do so. Instead, after showing, e.g., the transcendence of e and π , he presented
the real numbers axiomatically [1917, 42–62], as he had done in 1900.18
Hilbert then turned to the general notion of set. What is surprising here is that, like
Hausdorff in 1914, he did not use Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory but gave a naive
def nition of set: “A set is a system of well-def ned things, called elements” [1917, 63]. This
was Cantor’s def nition of set, to which Hilbert had himself objected 20 years earlier.
Next Hilbert considered f nite and denumerable sets. In the course of doing so, he in-
troduced the well-known Hilbert’s Hotel. Ordinary hotels have only f nitely many rooms.
When such a hotel is full and another guest comes, that guest cannot be accommodated. But
Hilbert’s Hotel has as many rooms as there are positive integers. So when Hilbert’s Hotel
is full and another guest comes, that guest can be accommodated. The occupant of room 1
must move to room 2, the occupant of room 2 to room 3, and so on. Then the new guest can
move into room 1 [1917, 66].
After discussing cardinal arithmetic on sets of the power of the continuum and showing,
for example, that the set of all continuous real functions has the power of the continuum,
Hilbert turned to what he called “two important problems” [1917, 85]. The f rst was the
Trichotomy of Cardinals, i.e., whether the cardinal numbers of any two sets A and B are
equal or one is greater than the other. The second was Cantor’s Continuum Problem, which
he called “very diff cult and fundamental” [1917, 118]. In order to discuss these problems, he
gave an introduction to ordered sets and especially to well-ordered sets. Here he expressed
his attitude toward Cantor’s ordinals and also toward philosophy:
18 He did mention Dedekind cuts in passing [1917, 39].
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It cannot be emphasized enough that the transf nite [ordinal] numbers are something quite real, and
something just as def nite as the f nite ordinal numbers.
It is an altogether essential superiority of mathematics, in contrast to philosophy, that in its speculations
it never wraps itself in fantastic and mystical darkness.19 [1917, 102]
Using the axiom of choice, he then gave a proof for Zermelo’s well-ordering theorem
and showed that it implies the trichotomy of cardinals. The well-ordering theorem, he
asserted, was “the second great advance which set theory has made since Cantor.”20 He
showed his familiarity with the recent literature by mentioning Hartogs’ proof (1915) that,
axiomatically, the trichotomy of cardinals implies the well-ordering theorem. Finally, he
concluded this chapter by discussing in detail how “the well-ordering theorem, strange to
say, plays a role in the parallelogram of forces” and implies, as Hamel had shown in 1905,
the existence of discontinuous real functions such that f (x + y) = f (x) + f (y).21
The f nal chapter of Hilbert’s lecture course was entitled “Applications of Set Theory
to Mathematical Logic.” Here he argued that set theory is the foundation of mathematics,
and so unclarities and contradictions in other branches of mathematics must be corrected
within set theory. He acknowledged that, because of the paradoxes, this was not yet the
case. Here he regarded Russell’s Paradox as “purely logical” [1917, 132], and contrasted it
with a paradox that he had found himself and that he described as “purely set-theoretic and
mathematical” [1917, 134]. In effect, his unpublished paradox, given in his 1905 course and
discussed above, created a model of Zermelo’s set theory as a set. Hilbert emphasized how
it used only mathematical concepts and operations (as opposed to those of pure logic), and
added: “I felt so much consternation when I found it that I said to myself: Now the entire
method of inference in all of mathematics must be def nitively reformed” [1917, 134].
What did Hilbert see as the source of his paradox? He laid the blame on the “genetic
def nition” of his set M . Although he did not make precise what he meant by “genetic
def nition,” he did remark that such a def nition used the word “all” in an illegitimate way
[1917, 136]. Among his examples of such an illegitimate genetic def nition was “the totality
of all objects of my thought,” which Dedekind had used in his ill-fated attempt to prove the
existence of an inf nite set [Hilbert 1917, 142].
He was much happier with Peano’s approach to this matter since Peano had explicitly
stated axioms for the natural numbers. All other axiom systems, he believed, were reducible
to that for the natural numbers. Thinking of Dedekind’s and Frege’s treatment of arithmetic
as a part of logic, he observed: “If we want to found the axioms for the [natural numbers]
by reducing them to the laws of logic itself, then we stand before one of the most diff cult
problems anywhere in mathematics” [Hilbert 1917, 145–146].
Next, in the context of Peano’s axioms, Hilbert made a statement that is very surprising in
view of his later work: “Since a mathematical existence proof is always understood only to
be a proof that the statement in question does not lead to a contradiction, then the existence of
the natural numbers cannot be proved in this sense. If, however, one assumes this consistency
without proof, then” the Peano postulates determine them up to isomorphism [1917, 148].
19 [Hilbert 1917, 119]. For his more positive views on philosophers, see [Peckhaus 1990, 224].
20 Although Hilbert did not state explicitly what the f rst advance was, it may well have been the Cantor–
Bernstein Theorem, which he referred to as the “Equivalence Theorem of Bernstein ... this fundamental theorem”
[1917, 81].
21 [Hilbert 1917, 119]. For a discussion of this surprising connection, see [Moore 1995, 12–14].
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What is surprising here is that, in his view, the consistency of the natural numbers cannot be
proved, since in his later work he would be particularly concerned to f nd such a consistency
proof for them.
Hilbert concluded his lectures by various examples, such as a Peano curve, to illustrate
how set theory was quite useful in geometry and real analysis [1917, 166].
8. HILBERT IN 1917–1918: LOGIC
Those lectures on set theory, delivered in the summer of 1917, were the f rst sign of
Hilbert’s serious return to foundational questions. But the lectures remained unpublished.
This return f rst resulted in a publication when, in September 1917, he gave a lecture at
Zurich on “Axiomatic Thinking” and printed it in Mathematische Annalen the following
year. In it he argued strongly for the axiomatic method in both mathematics and physics.
He saw axiomatization as appropriate for each branch of mathematics and physics once it
had reached a certain maturity.
It was in the Zurich lecture that Hilbert f nally, after a decade, mentioned Zermelo’s
axiomatization of set theory [1918a, 152]. Hilbert saw this axiomatization as limiting the
arbitrariness of def nitions in set theory, but in such a way that the scope and applicability
of set theory were not reduced.
Hilbert’s concern with consistency remained strong, and he pointed out that relative
consistency proofs could be used in all but two cases: the axioms for the natural numbers
and those for set theory. In these two cases a relative consistency proof could only come
from logic, and “thus it appears to be necessary to axiomatize logic itself and to show that
number theory and set theory are only parts of logic” [1918a, 153]. This statement shows
that, contrary to the usual interpretation, Hilbert was then a logicist—in the sense that he
believed mathematics can be reduced to logic.
Hilbert praisedRussell’s axiomatization of logic (the theory of types), but emphasized that
this axiomatization needed much further investigation: “the question of the consistency of
the natural numbers and of set theory is not an isolated one, but belongs to a broad domain
of the most diff cult epistemological questions of specif cally mathematical coloration”
[1918a, 153]. These questions concerned decidability and also the relation between content
and formalization in mathematics and logic.
During the winter semester of 1917–1918 Hilbert gave what is certainly his most impor-
tant lecture course on the foundations ofmathematics. The course consisted of two parts, the
f rst on the axiomatic method as illustrated primarily by geometry and the second on math-
ematical logic [1918b]. Although f rst part (60 pages) largely duplicated what he had done
before, the second part (170 pages) was strikingly new. In contrast to all his earlier courses
on logic, this one showed a surprising maturity. Whereas his 1905 course, for example,
used a limited Schro¨derian logic that was clearly inadequate to the needs of mathematics,
the 1917–1918 course was based on Russell’s theory of types. But Hilbert went far be-
yond Russell by separating out f rst-order logic as a subsystem. Over the next four decades,
f rst-order logic would become the overwhelmingly dominant form of mathematical logic.
The importance of this second part of the lectures is shown by the fact that they were
the basis for the 1928 book by Hilbert and his student Wilhelm Ackermann, Grundzu¨ge
der theoretischen Logik. The book had four chapters, entitled “Der Aussagenkalku¨l”,
“Der Pra¨dikaten-undKlassenkalku¨l”, “Der engere Funktionenkalku¨l”(f rst-order logic), and
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“Der erweiterte Funktionenkalku¨l” (higher-order logic), and these were borrowed word for
word from the titles of the chapters in the 1917–1918 course.22 Yet the book was by no
means simply lifted from the lectures. Sometimes lengthy passages were rewritten and then
made part of the book, while at other times passages were taken over directly, though in a
different order.23 The third and fourth chapters of the book were very heavily indebted to
the lectures, the second was somewhat indebted, and the f rst was hardly indebted at all. As
it happens, the f rst chapter owed much to Hilbert’s lecture course on logic given in [1921].
Set theory played only a secondary role in the 1917–1918 course, as it did in the later
book. But one aspect of that role is important in view of more recent developments. Hilbert
treated set theory within higher-order logic, rather than within f rst-order logic (as was done
by Skolem in 1923 and as is done now). Hilbert emphasized that higher-order logic was
essential for set theory and that f rst-order logic was not adequate for it.24
Hilbert was the f rst to treat f rst-order logic as a separate subsystem of logic and to discuss
what parts of mathematics could be treated in f rst-order logic. Among the examples that he
gave for which this could be donewere elementary number-theory and elementary geometry
[1918b, 181–186]. But he was convinced that f rst-order logic was not adequate for all of
mathematics.
His f rst examples of a mathematical proposition that went beyond f rst-order logic was
from the Peano postulates for the natural numbers, namely the principle of complete induc-
tion. He expressed this principle in the form “if a predicate is true for the number 1 and if,
in case it is true for a number, it is also true for the next number, then the predicate is true
for every number” [1918b, 189]. This principle went beyond f rst-order logic because, he
observed, to formalize it one needs to put in front of it the universal quantif er “for every
P,” where P ranges over predicates.
Next he turned to the concept of natural number as an illustration of the need to go beyond
f rst-order logic by considering propositional functions whose arguments are themselves
propositional functions. Here he treated natural numbers as properties of predicates, more
or less as Frege had done in 1884. Then Hilbert added: “From the standpoint of logic,
conceiving numbers as properties of predicates is the most obvious thing to do. To the
mathematician it is more familiar to consider numbers as properties of sets. That objectively
these two ways of considering the matter come down to the same thing becomes obvious if
we examine the relations between sets and predicates” [1918b, 193–194].Hilbert considered
each set to be def ned by a predicate.
What was the relationship between logic and number theory on the one hand and between
logic and set theory on the other?Hilbert had considered thismatter in his Heidelberg lecture
of 1904. There he wrote that “arithmetic is often considered to be a part of logic,” no doubt
thinking of Frege and perhaps also of Russell. “Yet if we observe attentively,” Hilbert added,
“we realize that in the traditional treatment of the laws of logic certain fundamental notions
from arithmetic are already used, such as the notion of set and, to some extent, that of number
22 The lectures also contained a f fth chapter, “Ueberleitung zum Funktionen-Kalku¨l.”
23 By way of example, consider the following passages. In the book, the passage on pp. 68–71. (“Wir wollen
nun...folgendermasen ableiten”) is taken almost verbatim from pp. 179–186 of the lectures. Likewise, in the book
the passage on pp. 109–110 (“Nach Dedekind... y die Eigenschaft P .”) is taken almost word for word from
pp. 237–238 of the lectures. Such examples could be multiplied indef nitely.
24 [Hilbert 1918b, 200]. On the emergence of f rst-order logic, see [Moore 1988].
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as well” [1905, 176]. Thus in 1904 he considered the notion of set to be “arithmetic,” i.e.,
part of arithmetic or number theory in the broad sense. This was in keeping with the general
approach whereby Cantor and Dedekind used set-theoretic notions in their reduction of the
real numbers to the rationals.
In the 1917–1918 lectures Hilbert’s perspective was somewhat different. “The relation of
logic to number theory,” he nowwrote, “is a special case of a more general relation between
logic and set theory” [1918b, 195]. He wanted to consider the relationship between logic
and set theory more closely, not only because he regarded set theory as important in the
foundation of mathematics but also because this relationship played a role in extending
f rst-order logic to higher-order logic.
He then turned to examples of the relationship between sets and predicates, such as the
power set of a set and the union (or intersection) of a set of sets. In all of these cases,
he reduced the sets to predicates. He had no way of expressing sets directly in his logical
symbolism, but he did have a way of expressing predicates. It was for this reason that he
regarded it as essential to use higher-order logic so as to be able to formulate set theory
within it [1918b, 200].
By examining the paradoxes of logic and set theory (such as Russell’s paradox and the
liar paradox), Hilbert concluded that it was necessary to use a theory of types. In fact,
what he used at f rst was a version of the simple theory of types [1918b, 218–223]. How-
ever, he then showed that Cantor’s proof for the existence of an uncountable set (now
rephrased in terms of predicates) could not be carried though in this theory. As a way out of
this diff culty, Hilbert then adopted Russell’s axiom of reducibility. Although Hilbert con-
sidered this axiom to be odd, he believed it to be necessary in order to develop set theory
and analysis within his logical calculus. Without that axiom, he insisted, every proposi-
tional function had to be explicitly given, and so all such functions would only form a
countable totality; hence they would not suff ce to represent uncountable sets, which are
essential in mathematics. With that axiom, he showed that Cantor’s proof for the existence
of an uncountable set could be carried through [1918b, 229–235]. He ended his lectures by
demonstrating how the axiom of reducibility enabled Dedekind’s construction of the real
numbers to be carried out in Hilbert’s system, and concluded that the ramif ed theory of
types is the proper tool through which to develop the foundations of higher mathematics
[1918b, 246].
9. HILBERT AND ZERMELO’S AXIOMATIZATION: 1920
WhenHilbert next discussed foundational questions, in a course given during the summer
semester of 1920, he treated several matters differently. The f rst of these concerned
Kronecker and Poincare´. In 1910 Hilbert had referred to Kronecker’s prejudices against
set theory, and in 1917 had again mentioned in passing Kronecker’s views [1918a, 132].
But in 1920Hilbertwasmuchmore negative towardKronecker, referring to him as “themost
thoroughgoing and radical dictator” in restricting set theory [1920, 17]. Likewise, Hilbert
underlined Poincare´’s rejection of the actual inf nite, set theory, and Zermelo’s proof of the
well-ordering theorem [1920, 20]. It is very likely that Hilbert took such a hard line toward
Kronecker and Poincare´, both of them dead, because of the very living critique of Brouwer
and Weyl against set theory and analysis. Indeed, Brouwer and Weyl were mentioned on
the very f rst page of Hilbert’s 1920 lectures.
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The second important shift in those lectures concerned Zermelo’s axiomatization. Al-
though Hilbert had mentioned this axiomatization in passing in his Zurich lecture, these
1920 lectures were the f rst time that he discussed it in detail and treated it very positively:
“The person who in recent years has newly founded [set] theory and who has done so, in
my view, in the most precise way which is at the same time appropriate to the spirit of the
theory, that person is Zermelo” [1920, 21–22]. Hilbert contrasted Kronecker’s prohibitions
about set theory with the views of Zermelo, who prohibited only as much as was needed
to remove the contradictions. Moreover, Hilbert saw Zermelo as making precise Cantor’s
notion of “consistent set.” Since Zermelo’s axiomatic set theory included all special mathe-
matical theories (such as number theory and geometry), then by establishing the consistency
of Zermelo’s theory, one would also establish the consistency of all those special theories
[1920, 23].
Hilbert presented in detail a version of Zermelo’s axioms within axiomatic logic. All
formulas were built up with a symbolic version of the usual connectives such as “or” and
“not”, together with “for all” and “there exists.” Such formulas were built up from two
relation symbols, Id(x, y) or identity, and E(x, y) or membership. But the only assumptions
made about Id(x, y) and E(x, y) were that they satisf ed the axioms. (For Id(x, y) these
axioms made it ref exive, symmetric, and transitive.) He made precise Zermelo’s notion of
“def nite” property by assuming that “only such expressions are introduced as predicates and
relationswhich are built up from Id(x, y) andE(x, y) bymeans of the logical connectives and
by the substitution of proper names” [1920, 23]. In this framework he presented Zermelo’s
axioms as Zermelo had given them in 1908. The only exception was in reformulating
Zermelo’s axiom of elementary sets as what he called “Axiom fu¨r das endliche Operieren.”
This reformulation assumed the existence of a set M ∪ {A} when M and A were given
[1920, 25]. He used this reformulation to give Zermelo’s axiom of inf nity in the form
that is standard now, rather than the form originally used. In fact, this “Axiom fu¨r das
endliche Operieren” was one which Zermelo himself had introduced and then abandoned,
in a preliminary version of his axiomatization [Moore 1982, 155].
Hilbert then turned to the question of whether, and to what degree, this axiom system
for set theory can be deduced from pure logic, and added: “The old problem of reducing
all of mathematics to logic gains a strong stimulus through Zermelo’s axiom system ...”
[1920, 27]. As he had done in the 1917–1918 course, Hilbert underlined the parallelism
between sets and predicates. Now he emphasized this parallelism from the perspective of
reducing mathematics to logic. The theory of predicates reduced Zermelo’s system to pure
logic, but, Hilbert emphasized, there was a diff culty surrounding the expression “there is a
predicate P.” This diff culty, which had been recognized by Russell and Weyl, affected the
operation of taking the union of a collection of sets. In general, one could not take such
a union. It was necessary not to use “there is a predicate P” in the logical construction of
predicates, or else the paradoxes would come back. He concluded that “today the goal of
reducing set theory to logic (and thereby also reducing the customary methods of analysis
to logic) has not been achieved, and perhaps cannot be achieved in general” [1920, 33].
Thus he was no longer a logicist. But, he insisted, the importance of the axiomatic methods
does not depend on such a reduction.
Hilbert’s overall assessment of Zermelo’s system was that it was “the most brilliant
example of a perfected elaboration of the axiomatic method” [1920, 33]. He then turned to
criticizing Brouwer andWeyl for crippling thismethod. From their standpoint, he added, the
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Continuum Problem disappears, although this is “one of the most stimulating and ambitious
problems in mathematics” [1920, 34].
Hilbert devoted the rest of his course to the consistency of number theory. The weak
version of number theory that he considered did not include much more than his 1904
version, and so his consistency proof for it was not really an advance. Yet he was now
turning def nitively to his emerging Beweistheorie, which was to be the subject of several
more lecture courses over the next few years.
10. HILBERT AND THE AXIOM OF CHOICE: 1922–1923
The f rst publication in which Hilbert developed his proof theory in detail beyond what he
had done in 1904 (and f rst spoke explicitly about “Beweistheorie” and “Metamathematik”)
was his Hamburg lecture [1922]. There he said very little about Zermelo’s axiomatization
[1922, 162], but Zermelo’s axiom of choice played a role: “In mathematical matters there
must in principle be no doubt .... It must be possible to formulate Zermelo’s set-theoretic
axiom of choice in such a way that it is just as reliably valid, and in the same sense, as the
arithmetic assertion that 2 + 2 = 4” [1922, 157]. At this point the axiom of choice was for
him an important test case. Soon it played an even more fundamental role.
In a lecture given to the Deutsche Naturforscher-Gesellschaft in September 1922 and
published the following year, Hilbert made the axiom of choice the cornerstone of his proof
theory. Dismissing the critics of this axiom, he wrote grandly:
The essential idea on which the axiom of choice is based constitutes a general logical principle, which,
even for the f rst elements of mathematical inference, is necessary and indispensable. When we secure
these f rst elements, we obtain at the same time the foundation for the axiom of choice; both are done
by means of my proof theory. [1923, 152]
What Hilbert had in mind was a new postulate for logic. This postulate embodied a version
of the axiom of choice, and enabled him to avoid introducing the quantif ers “for all” and
“there exists” directly. Instead they could be def ned from this new simple postulate. It relied
on a new logical function τ which was a kind of “anti-choice” function acting on predicate.
His new postulate, which he called “the transf nite axiom,” was the following:
A(τ A) → A(a).
In words, this stated that if a predicate A(x) is true for the particular object that the
function τ assigns to A(x), then A(x) is true for any object whatsoever [1923, 156].
Hilbert called his axiom “transf nite” because it went beyond what he considered f nitary
axioms, such as those in propositional logic. He conceived of it as an “ideal element,” in
the sense that geometry appended points at inf nity. He pointed out that his axiom was
provable in the case of number theory (since the natural numbers are well-ordered). By way
of example, he used his axiom to deduce the axiom of choice for any family of sets of real
numbers [1923, 159–165].
The transf nite axiom would soon undergo some changes. In some handwritten notes
appended to the Ausarbeitung of his lecture course “Logische Grundlagen derMathematik”
from the winter semester of 1922–1923, he made a note to replace τ A with εA. Despite this
change of notation, the axiom remained the same. Only in his 1926 essay on the inf nite did
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he revise his axiom to state
A(a) → A(εA),
where εA was now a choice function picking any object b such that A(b) was true. Thus this
new axiom, the ε-axiom, stated that if A(x) was true when x was the object a, then A(x)
was true when X was the object εA. Hilbert then referred to his function εA as a “transf nite
logical choice function.”25
11. HILBERT AND THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS: 1924–1928
As early as 1900, in his Paris problems, Hilbert had emphasized the importance of
Cantor’s continuum problem: To determine for which ordinal α the cardinal of the set of
all real numbers is ℵα . The continuum hypothesis (CH) is true if α = 1. Cantor himself
had shown that α is not 0. In his 1917 lecture course on set theory, Hilbert was aware
that Julius Ko¨nig [1905] had shown that α is not ω. Moreover, in this course Hilbert
asserted that “the continuum problem is the principal problem in all of set theory” [1917,
154]. He thought it extremely probable that CH is true. In particular, he was convinced
that it was unlikely that α was inf nite, and even less likely that it was f nite but greater
than one.
Hilbert’s famous essay “U¨ber das Unendliche” of 1926 contained his serious, but fun-
damentally mistaken, attempt to prove CH. Before turning to that essay, however, we must
consider the lecture course bearing the same title which he gave during the winter semester
of 1924–1925. Hilbert used the Ausarbeitung of this lecture course to prepare the text of the
lecture that he delivered on the inf nite at Mu¨nster in June 1925 and published in [1926].
Among the passages taken over verbatim from the lecture course to the published lecture
was the following: “From time immemorial the inf nite has stirred the mind and heart of
man like no other question; the inf nite has had a more stimulating and fruitful effect on
human understanding than scarcely any other idea; yet the inf nite needs to be clarified like
no other concept” [1925, 1; 1926, 163].
The lecture course, which was devoted to the various guises of the inf nite (in number
theory, geometry, and analysis; in atomic theory, probability theory, and biology; and f nally
in set theory and logic), ended with a discussion of his proof theory. The f nal paragraph
was devoted to CH. After his claim to have shown the consistency of the proposition that
every mathematical problem can be solved, he added: “As far as I see at present, the most
important step toward solving the Continuum Problem is taken in this way, and in the
aff rmative sense” [1925, 136]. Thus he believed himself to have proved CH.
In his Mu¨nster lecture he sketched his proof in some detail, something totally lacking
in the course. Again he claimed that his proof theory could establish CH, and observed:
“The continuum problem is distinguished by its originality and its inner beauty; it has the
advantage over other famous problems of combining in itself two qualities: Its solution
requires new methods, since the old ones fail to settle it, and, moreover, its solution in and
of itself has the greatest interest on account of the result that is to be established” [1926,
180]. Instead of using the real numbers, he employed the set of number-theoretic functions,
25 [Hilbert 1926, 178]. Now A(εA) was taken to be the def nition of the existential quantif er “for some x, A(x)”
rather than the universal quantif er “for every x , A(x).”
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and concerned himself with the possible def nitions of such functions and of transf nite
ordinals. For such def nitions of functions he introduced what he called “Variablentypen.”
Hilbert came back to CH in his Hamburg lecture delivered in July 1927 and published in
[1928]. Although he pointed out that his sketch of a proof for CH had been criticized, he
made no mention of who had done so [1928, 81].
In an essay on the foundations of arithmetic, Bernays later remarked [1935, 205] that
Hilbert, when reprinting his 1926 and 1928 articles on proof theory, omitted those parts
devoted to his attempt to prove CH. At the same time Blumenthal referred to Hilbert’s 1926
article as “a daring series of inferences ... leading to the solution of the continuum problem”
[1935, 424]. Since both Bernays’ and Blumenthal’s essays appeared in 1935 within the
third volume of Hilbert’s Gesammelte Abhandlungen, it is diff cult to know which view
Hilbert favored—Bernays’, suggesting that Hilbert’s “proof” of CH was unsuccessful, or
Blumenthal’s, asserting the opposite.
In any case, there was no lack of criticism of Hilbert’s purported proof, beginning in
1928. Abraham Fraenkel, a ring theorist who became a set theorist, argued that Hilbert had
not offered a proof of CH but a possible proof for the consistency of CH. Nevertheless,
Fraenkel added, this sketch of a proof could not be regarded as conclusive so long as it was
not carried out in detail—especially for some of Hilbert’s lemmas, which seemed to be as
diff cult as CH itself [Fraenkel 1928, 375].
Also in 1928, the Russian analyst Nikolai Luzin raised doubts about Hilbert’s proof at
the International Congress of Mathematicians in Bologna, where Hilbert himself spoke on
foundational questions. Luzin askedwhether that proofwould be accepted by allmathemati-
cians, both “idealists and realists” as he called them, following Lebesgue’s philosophical
terminology. Luzin, who sided with realists such as Lebesgue, considered Hilbert’s ar-
gument to border on Richard’s paradox, and hence believed that this argument would be
rejected even by idealist mathematicians [1929, 297].
A third mathematician to express doubts about the proof was the Norwegian logician
Thoralf Skolem, a thoroughgoing opponent of uncountable sets who espoused a kind of
set-theoretic relativism in which all models of set theory are countable. In 1929, at a Scandi-
navian Mathematical Congress, he mentioned that Hilbert’s proof was very problematical:
“I have spoken about it with many mathematicians, and I have the impression that very
few of them believe his assertions to be correct” [1929, 18]. Skolem referred, for perhaps
the f rst time in print, to Hilbert’s famous sentence which begins the present paper: “He
[Hilbert] also said that he wants not be driven out of Cantor’s paradise. It is very curious to
compare his remark with that of Poincare´, mentioned earlier, that set theory is a disease.”26
Within Hilbert’s proof, Skolem objected particularly to the lemma asserting that no
“Variablentypen” of rank higher than the second number-class needed to be used. In the
end, this objection turned out to be ironic, since Hilbert’s lemma, rephrased in the context
of Go¨del’s constructible sets of 1939, turned out to be exactly what was needed to prove
the relative consistency of CH.
12. CONCLUSION
Hilbert had spoken to the International Congress at Bologna in 1928, and the resulting
article was published in its proceedings and in Mathematische Annalen [1930]. There he
26 [Hilbert 1929, 19]. On this famous “remark” by Poincare´, see [Gray 1991].
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again praised Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory and embraced the axiom of choice, in
the form of the ε-axiom, as the foundation of his proof theory [1930, 2–3]. He had no further
new ideas vis-a-vis set theory, and his mathematical career was almost over. However, his
collaborator Bernays did have an important new idea within a Hilbertian framework. In a
course at Go¨ttingen on mathematical logic which Bernays gave in the winter semester of
1929–1930, he put forward his axioms for set theory, later known at the Bernays–Go¨del
system of set theory. Some seven years would pass before Bernays published those axioms
[1937].
What did Hilbert contribute to set theory during the three decades in which he was ac-
tively involved with it? He did not publish any new set-theoretic results. His attempt to
prove CHwas abortive, although it probably had some inf uence on Go¨del’s relative consis-
tency proof. He did use set-theoretic ideas, especially the axiom of choice, in mathematical
logic. Above all, he helped to legitimize set theory as an important part of mathematics,
though not as a foundation for mathematics. During the same period he encouraged his
students and colleagues to investigate and apply set theory. In this vein, he supervised doc-
toral dissertations on set theory by Bernstein (1901), Grelling (1910),27 and the Rumanian
mathematician Gabriel Sudan (1925). He exchanged many letters with Cantor, and in both
published and unpublished work he repeatedly praised, and expounded, the set-theoretic
contributions of Cantor and Dedekind. Finally, he repeatedly thrust the axiom of choice and
the continuum hypothesis into the limelight.
The value that Hilbert placed on Cantor’s work is particularly clear in the draft of a letter
found in his Nachlass. Hilbert’s undated letter, addressed to an unnamed colleague, was
written after Cantor’s death in 1918:
It gives me great joy to contribute to the remembrance of Georg Cantor, who is one of the f rst in the
successive masters of our science. For originality and boldness of thought, there is no mathematician
in history—from Euclid to Einstein—who surpassed him. He created something completely new: set
theory. Its conceptual methods and applications have by now become the common property of all
mathematicians, although I believe that it is only in recent decades that the deepest thoughts of his
theory have had their greatest effects. [Purkert 1986, 326]
Thanks in no small measure to Hilbert’s inf uence, during the period 1900–1930 set
theory moved from the periphery of mathematics to a position much closer to the center.
Hilbert had successfully combated the Kroneckerian inf uences which, he felt, endangered
the proper growth of mathematics.
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